Philosophy of Emotions by Nicolae, Sfetcu
 Philosophy of Emotions 
 
Nicolae Sfetcu 
24.01.2020 
 
Sfetcu, Nicolae, "Philosophy of Emotions", SetThings (January 18, 2020), URL = 
https://www.setthings.com/en/philosophy-of-emotions/  
 
Email: nicolae@sfetcu.com  
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nd/4.0/.  
 
 
A partial translation of: 
Sfetcu, Nicolae, " Emoțiile și inteligența emoțională în organizații", SetThings (31 decembrie 
2019), MultiMedia Publishing (ISBN 978-606-033-328-9), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32991.20640, 
URL = https://www.setthings.com/ro/e-books/emotiile-si-inteligenta-emotionala-in-organizatii/ 
 
 
The emotion was excluded from knowledge since ancient times, when Democritus stated 
that "Medicine cures diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from emotions". (Diels și Kranz 
1951, 68 B 31) Such a view says that "reason should be the master of passion." The best-known 
inverted statement belongs to Hume, according to which reason is and should be the slave of 
passions. (Hume 1978, II.iii.3, 415) Emotions have been recognized as threats to rational and 
epistemic decisions, (Sorabji 2002, 55) correlating emotions with will or desire (emotions would 
be a means by which will or desire they can distort reason or perception or a rational process). 
Therefore, emotions must be mastered (according to the Stoics) or accepted only the "right" 
(according to Aristotle). 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Philosophy of Emotions 
2 
Another criticism is that emotions do not contribute to knowledge, being too subjective or 
private to be relevant. Also, even if it is admitted that there are emotions related to knowledge by 
motivating and regulating cognitive activities, the motivational force is often rejected as 
epistemologically irrelevant. For example, Descartes considers that emotion may motivate us to 
acquire a belief, but does not enter into the epistemic evaluation of faith, based on the distinction 
between the validity of beliefs and theories and the history of their formation on which one believes 
that it is epistemologically irrelevant. (Descartes 1989, par. 69) In the case of emotions that involve 
an evaluation of a propositional content in relation to a certain cognitive standard, they are 
considered to be not sources of knowledge, because their affective attitudinal aspect does not 
contribute to the justification of the embodied belief, being no better than the guessing acts or cases 
of clairvoyance. 
Descartes, in Meditations, considers certainty or infallibility as the requirements of 
knowledge, more important deductively than inferences for epistemic foundations and algorithms 
to choose between competing theories. (Descartes 2016) In this regard, emotions are not promising 
candidates, as their cognitive outcome seems particularly weak. The analysis in terms of true belief 
in contemporary analytical epistemology, as a model, is also unfavorable to emotions, since the 
condition of justification remains related to the inferential relations between beliefs. There have 
been attempts to eliminate the condition of justification under the cognitive control of the epistemic 
subject, using ideas such as appropriate causal chains, (Goldman 1967) reliable mechanisms of 
belief formation, (Goldman 1976) or the proper functioning of cognitive systems. (Plantinga 1986) 
Such externalist tendencies in epistemic justification have blurred the distinction between the 
context of discovery and the context of justification. 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Philosophy of Emotions 
3 
In the epistemological context, two questions have a special relevance: "are emotions 
knowledge?" and "is a uniform theory of emotions necessary to evaluate the epistemological state 
of emotions?". A restrictive interpretation of "knowledge" requires theories to have propositional 
content. In such a case, emotions are usually assimilated to normative beliefs or judgments. 
(Solomon 1993, cap. 5.3) More liberal interpretations of "knowledge" also include theories that 
interpret emotions on the perception model, such as De Sousa's study, The Rationality of Emotion 
((de Sousa 1987); cf. (de Sousa 2004)) also supported by Sabine Döring, Elgin (Brun et al. 2008) 
and Prinz. (Prinz 2004) A minimal definition of cognitive theories of emotions includes the 
assertion that emotions are intentional. (Brun et al. 2008, 225–26) According to this criterion, 
strictly behavioral theories and theories that reduce emotions to feelings are not cognitive. 
Recently, emotions have been re-evaluated as candidates for epistemic functions, often 
being rated as rational or appropriate. The cognitive rationality of emotions is their ability to 
represent the world as it is. (de Sousa 2011) The possibility of the adequacy of emotions being 
interpreted as emotional truth is disputed, (Salmela 2006) contrary to the opinion that they distort 
knowledge. It would be fair to specify the conditions under which they contribute to knowledge. 
Also, the claim is made that the confidentiality and subjectivity of emotions make them 
epistemically useless, (Goldie 2004, 94–95) (Solomon 2007, 150–58) highlighting the analogy 
between emotion and perception. (de Sousa 1987, 145–58) (Deonna 2006) Current philosophical 
theories about emotions claim that emotions include a cognitive element and can therefore be 
evaluated. Their cognitive functions require an epistemological analysis that can lead to an 
epistemological reassessment of emotions. Thus, as opposed to the traditional properties of 
knowledge, by approaching cognitive activities, motivation, highlighting and relevance of 
emotions become epistemological aspects of interest. 
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According to Scarantino and de Sousa, there are three varieties of cognitive rationality for 
emotions: matching, assurance and coherence. (Scarantino și de Sousa 2018) Emotions are often 
devoid of reason, but in many cases manifest coherence, through cognitions that provide emotions 
with representations of their particular objects. When cognitions are beliefs, their change is 
consistently reflected in changes in emotions. As a special case of rationality in the coherence of 
emotion sets, Helm argued that emotions come in rational patterns centered around the things that 
are important to the agent. (Helm 2009) According to Brun, emotions are important in the context 
of discovery, because they influence the way researchers work, but they are irrelevant in the 
context of justification, because the validity of the results is independent of such emotions. (Brun 
et al. 2008) 
Although emotions are often part of the processes of knowledge, it has been assumed that 
the function of the justification condition is to exclude beliefs that are only incidentally true. So, 
only the features that systematically contribute to the truth of knowledge have been seen as 
normative, and thus epistemologically relevant. From this perspective, emotions do not seem to be 
epistemologically relevant. Ernest Sosa, (Sosa 1985) James Montmarquet (Montmarquet 1993) 
and Linda Zagzebski (Zagzebski și Zagaebski 1996) adopted the notion of virtue from ethical 
theory, focusing on epistemic or intellectual virtues, reversing the direction of epistemological 
analysis. Virtue epistemologists begin with normative properties of epistemic agents. Emotions 
thus come to matter within such a strategy, contributing to the analysis of epistemic traits. The 
social epistemology of Lorraine Code (Code 1987) and Alvin Goldman (Goldman 1999) takes into 
account processes in epistemic communities, and feminist philosophy examines the epistemic 
significance of agents with gender differences. (Jaggar 1989) (Diamond 1991) Quine and others 
initiated the project of naturalizing epistemology by assimilating it into psychology and cognitive 
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science. (Quine 1969) Philosophical theories about emotions with their cognitive significance have 
been resurrected (for example, (Kenny 2003)), and psychology has begun to provide emotions 
with a central place. (Lazarus 1999) 
Discussions about the nature of emotions address a confusing variety of characteristics, 
such as feelings, behavior, bodily reactions, cognitions, action dispositions, etc. Emotions are also 
associated with causes and intentionality, and may include certain evaluations, beliefs, or another 
knowledge. Emotions can be analyzed in terms of narrative structure, being incorporated into 
society and culture. Jesse Prinz states that this multiplicity of characteristics confronts the theories 
of emotions with a "problem of parts" (with different characteristics of the emotions and 
functions), as well as with a "problem of plenty".(Prinz 2004, cap. 1) 
An emotion is intentional or object-oriented (Kenny 2003, 131–35) if it has a “formal” 
object, (de Sousa 2007, 5) defined as property x must have, or norm x must be respected, and if a 
specific emotional episode is oriented towards something (the "material" or "particular" object, 
which is in line with the formal object). Accounts that simply identify emotions with awareness of 
bodily change are not considered intentional. Alternatively to a general cognitive theory of 
emotions, it can be considered that certain emotions are specifically cognitive in one of the above 
senses. 
Emotions motivate activities. (see case study from (Thagard 2002)). This makes them 
important for knowledge. Emotions are mechanisms that make us learn something. (Wilson și Keil 
2001, 274–75) The distinction between discovery and justification contexts suggests that emotion 
motivation is not epistemologically relevant. But it can be counter-argued by shifting the 
epistemological attention from the result pursued to the pursuit itself (from knowledge and / or 
true belief to epistemic activities and cognitive agents). Both Elgin (Elgin 1999, 121–22) and 
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Hookway (Hookway 2000) believe that the justification of beliefs can be conceived as dependent 
on the history of their acquisition. "And since beliefs have to be evaluated in relation to cognitive 
actions, their evaluation may also depend on the identity and properties of desires, goals, 
mechanisms, motivations and virtues." (Brun) Because emotions with motivational force can be 
themselves normatively evaluated, they could be included. in the justifications of the beliefs. 
(Fairweather și Zagzebski 2001) 
De Sousa believes that emotions can be a source for importance and relevance. (de Sousa 
2007, 137) According to De Sousa's argument, emotions, acting as sources of cleanliness, 
influence the necessary reduction of the number of actions and consequences in the case of an 
extremely large number of such possibilities. (Ketelaar și Todd 2001, 200–203) Emotions can 
become evident when they focus on certain aspects of a situation, acting as "spotlights", (Peters 
2006, 458) in extremely complex ways. Thus, Elgin regards emotion as "a frame of mind or pattern 
of attention that synchronizes feelings, attitudes, actions, and circumstances." (Elgin 1999, 148) 
As sources of relevance and highlighting, emotions are themselves assessments, and can in turn 
be evaluated. 
Brun (Brun et al. 2008) also consider salience as an example of epistemic immediacy, and 
the relevance of emotions helps if distinction between alternative scenarios is needed. (Goldman 
1986) Brun also argues that emotions are an additional source of knowledge, arguing that emotions 
provide epistemic access to otherwise inaccessible facts; a weaker argument is that emotions can 
be sources of true beliefs, but they are not indispensable. According to Elgin, emotions provide 
epistemic access to certain response-dependent properties that are directly related to 
emotions.(Brun et al. 2008, 164–65) 
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Some authors argue that emotions are not just reactions to stimuli, they are influenced by 
beliefs, thus giving access to more general facts (e.g. (Goldie 2004, 94–99)) by being “sensitive to 
information”. (Elgin 1999, 156) In support of the strong claim that epistemically accessible facts 
exist only through emotions, Elgin refers to emotions that provide epistemic access to one's own 
propositional attitudes and commitments, provided that someone else knows how to interpret those 
emotions, (Elgin 1999, 159–61) an aspect imposed by the models of emotional intelligence. 
Cognitive theories of emotions claim that emotions embody beliefs or other propositional content. 
Critics of the epistemological significance of emotions invoke the distinction between the context 
of discovery and the context of justification, and consider that epistemological relevance cannot 
be claimed for emotions in general, but only for a subset of epistemically specific emotions, and 
some of the mental states that epistemologists have invoked recently as emotions are not really 
emotions. 
A long-standing debate concerns the extent to which the objects of emotions must be 
identified with their causes. Scarantino and de Sousa consider that a taxonomy of the different 
types of possible emotional objects is needed, defining a formal object, essential for defining a 
particular emotion, as a property implicitly attributed by emotion to its objective or propositional 
object, by virtue of whose emotion can be seen as intelligible. (Scarantino și de Sousa 2018) 
Darwin considered that emotional expressions once served functions, but now accompany 
particular emotions because of their usefulness in communication. (Darwin și Prodger 1998) Paul 
Ekman argues that emotional expressions are important parts of "affect programs" - complex 
responses found in all human populations that are controlled by mechanisms that function below 
the level of consciousness. (Ekman, Friesen, și Ellsworth 1972) 
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Cognitivists usually argue that emotions involve propositional attitudes. Some of them 
universalize this feature and argue that any emotion must involve some kind of attitude toward a 
sentence. Critics of cognitive theories assume that there are various confusions in the very concept 
of "knowledge" that have blurred most of the concepts that invoke this term. (Power și Dalgleish 
2007) (Debes 2009) John Deigh states that these theories have the effect of excluding language-
impaired animals and infants. (Deigh 1994) A frequent criticism is the "fear of flying" objection: 
propositional attitudes are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of an emotion, because 
I can be aware that flight is the safest means of transport and yet I am afraid of flight. (Stocker și 
Hegeman 1996) An analogy with perceptual illusions can be suggested here, which sometimes the 
right faith fails to dispel ("recalcitrant emotions"). It is impossible to assimilate at least some 
emotions, to judgment or to faith. (Solomon, Solomon, și Press 2004) (Brady 2009) One 
counterargument would be that this objection only sets the difference between the propositional 
content of emotion and that of belief, not that the emotions have no propositional content at all. 
(Peacocke 2001) 
An important goal of the cognitivist theories is to avoid taxing emotions as merely 
"subjective". Sometimes emotions are subjective in the sense that they reflect only something that 
belongs exclusively and contingently to the subject's mind. The connection between emotion and 
knowledge can be argued by demonstrating the analogy between emotions and perceptions. 
Another way to argue this connection is to highlight the role of emotions as a framework for more 
conventional type of cognitions. (de Sousa 1987) (A. Rorty 1980) Under this framework, emotions 
are specific perceptions - ways of seeing. There is a long-term narrative approach to emotions, (A. 
O. Rorty 1987) according to which a story unfolds during each emotional episode, (de Sousa 1987) 
to which a certain "paradigm scenario" corresponds. Later, the respective stories are completed 
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and perfected by art. Scenarios involve both a type of situation that provides the characteristic 
objects and a set of answers. Thus, we get to interpret various real situations through the prism of 
different paradigm scenarios, modifying our inherent perceptual and cognitive dispositions. 
There is a debate about the philosophical theories of emotions regarding the possibility of 
developing a uniform theory of emotions. Amélie Rorty and Paul Griffiths have argued that 
emotions are not a natural type. (Solomon, Solomon, și Press 2004, 269–78) (Griffiths 2004, 76–
88) Thus, Rorty argues that there is no clear distinction between emotions and other mental states, 
and therefore the philosophy of emotions should be integrated into a comprehensive framework. 
of a philosophy of mind. (Solomon 2004, 84) Griffiths argues that diversity of emotions does not 
allow for a unified scientific theory, that is, the category of emotions cannot be used to reliably 
obtain the inductive generalizations that scientists need to explain the mechanisms underlying 
emotions. Brun's conclusion is that certain emotions perform some epistemic functions - perhaps 
only in certain circumstances - while other emotions are not appropriate for these functions or are 
completely epistemologically irrelevant. (Brun et al. 2008) 
In order to identify the basic teleology of emotions (for what they are), one can start from 
the trichotomy introduced by David Marr. (Marr 1982) For this purpose we take into the 
subfunctions that the natural selection has created to perform the functions that are said to be 
affected by the emotion, and the actual neuro-physiological processes through which these sub-
functions are normally performed. Simpler, universal emotions are determined by the basic needs 
of organisms, (Ekman, Friesen, și Ellsworth 1972) have proven to be universal. Griffiths argued 
that only Ekman's six core programs form natural types. Charland  counter-argued that a sufficient 
level of homology can be found to unite at least the basic emotions as a class,(Charland 2002) 
supporting Panksepp's integrated mechanism with seven basic emotions. (Panksepp 2000) 
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Dynamic systems theories have appeared relatively slowly, some of them relying on 
dynamic systems theory to model the evasive combination of unpredictability and patterned 
coherence found in evolution throughout individuality. (Magai și Haviland-Jones 2002) 
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